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Abstract 
We present numerical simulations measuring secrecy and efficiency 
rate of Information Theoretically Secure protocol based on Deep 
Random assumption presented in former article [9]. Those simulations 
specifically measure the respective error rates of both legitimate 
partner and eavesdropper experimented during the exchange of a data 
flow through the protocol. The measurements of the error rates also 
enable us to estimate a lower bound of the Cryptologic Limit 
introduced in [9]. We discuss the variation of the protocol’s 
parameters and their impact on the measured performance. 
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I. Introduction and summary of former work 
Modern cryptography mostly relies on mathematical problems commonly trusted as very difficult to 
solve, such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithm, belonging to complexity theory. No 
certainty exists on the actual difficulty of those problems. Some other methods, rather based on 
information theory, have been developed since early 90’s. Those methods relies on hypothesis about 
the opponent (such as « memory bounded » adversary [6]) or about the communication channel (such 
as « independent noisy channels » [5]) ; unfortunately, if their perfect secrecy have been proven under 
given hypothesis, none of those hypothesis are easy to ensure in practice. At last, some other methods 
based on physical theories like quantum indetermination [3] or chaos generation have been described 
and experimented, but they are complex to implement, and, again, relies on solid but not proven and 
still partly understood theories. 
Considering this theoretically unsatisfying situation, we have proposed in [9] to explore a new path, 
where proven information theoretic security can be reached, without assuming any limitation about the 
opponent, who is supposed to have unlimited calculation and storage power, nor about the 
communication channel, that is supposed to be perfectly public, accessible and equivalent for any 
playing party (legitimate partners and opponents). In our model of security, the legitimate partners of 
the protocol are using Deep Random generation to generate their secret information, and the behavior 
of the opponent, when inferring from public information, is governed by Deep Random assumption, 
that we introduce. 
 
  
Back on the Deep random assumption 
We have introduced in [9] the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability theory as 
developed by Jaynes [7]. Deep Random assumption is an objective principle to assign probability, 
compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by Jaynes [7]. 
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory. 
If we denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability 
distribution of a certain random variable   (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of 
that variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  , it is then 
possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information      
   regarding an experiment of  ; we denote this set of possible distributions as: 
   
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning 
in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider 
groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable  , that do not change 
the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation   of such group, the 
observer has no information enabling him to privilege   ( )   (   | ) rather than     ( )  
 (   ( )| ) as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7]. 
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and 
bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups   as the ones fulfilling 
the 2 conditions below: 
(  ) Stability - For any distribution      , and for any transformation    , then         
(  ) Convexity - Any distribution that is invariant by action of   does belong to    
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of   is exactly: 
  ( )  {
 
| |
∑    
   
|      } 
For any group   of transformations applying on the sample space  , we denote by   ( ) the set of all 
possible conditional expectations when the distribution of   courses   ( ). In other words: 
  ( )  { ( )   [ | ]|      ( )} 
Or also: 
  ( )  { ( )  ∫   ( )  
 
 
|      ( )} 
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if     , the strategy    of the opponent observer  , 
in order to estimate   from the public information  , should be chosen by the opponent observer   
within the restricted set of strategies: 
     ( )                                                                      ( ) 
  
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of   to choose his 
strategy in order estimate the private information   from his knowledge of the public information  . It 
is a fully reasonable assumption because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action 
of a transformation that let the distribution uncertainty unchanged. 
( ) suggests of course that    should eventually be picked in ⋂   ( )    , but it is enough for our 
purpose to find at least one group of transformation with which one can apply efficiently the Deep 
Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an advantage distilled by the legitimate 
partners compared to the opponent. 
The security model 
We have considered in [9] secrecy protocols being specific case of the Csiszàr and Körner model, 
where all the information exchanged by the legitimate partners   and   over the main channel are 
fully available to the passive opponent  .   has unlimited computing and storage power.   and   share 
initially no private information. 
  is capable to Read all published bit strings from the main channel, Store bit strings, and Make 
calculation on bit strings, with unlimited computing and storage power. But when   desires to infer a 
private information generated by  ’s DRG (or by  ’s DRG) from public information, he can only do it 
in respect of the Deep Random assumption ( ) presented in previous section. This assumption creates 
a ‘virtual’ side channel for the opponent conditioning the optimal information   he can obtain to 
estimate the Secret Common Output information  . 
This assumption is fully reasonable, as established in the former sections, under the condition that the 
DRG of   and the DRG of   can actually produce distributions that are truly undistinguishable and 
unpredictable among a set   ( ). 
The protocols that we consider obey the Kerckhoffs’s principle by the fact that their specifications are 
entirely public.  
 
Information Theoretically Secure Protocols (ITSP) 
The main purpose of this work is to introduce how to design an « Information Theoretically Secure 
Protocol » (ITSP) under Deep Random assumption, and to introduce how to generate Deep Random 
from classical computing resources. 
We consider protocols as per the Security Model presented in previous section,  
  
 
in which   (resp.  ) requests its Deep Random Generator (DRG) to obtain an experiment   (resp.  ) 
of a private random variable with hidden probability distribution   (resp.   );   (resp.  ) publishes 
the set of information   (resp.  ) on the public channel along the protocol.   calculates the Secret 
Common Output information  (     ), with value in metric space  .   calculates its estimation 
 (     ) of the Secret Common Output information, also with value in  . In this model,    is the 
public information available regarding the DRG of   or   (that are supposed to have the same design), 
and    {   } is the set of information published by the partners along the execution of the protocol. 
The DRG of   is run by   completely privately and independently of  , and reversely the DRG of   
is run by   completely privately and independently of  . The 2 DRG are thus not in any way secretly 
correlated, as one of the assumptions of the security model is that   and   share initially no private 
information. 
The eavesdropping opponent   who has a full access to the public information, calculates its own 
estimation  ( ) (that we will also shortly denote  (   )).   is called ‘strategy’ of the opponent. 
As introduced in the ‘Deep Random assumption’ section,    designates the public information 
available about a DRG. We assume here that    is the same for both DRG of   and  , meaning that 
they have the same design. 
From the Deep Random assumption, for any group   in   , the set of optimal strategies for the 
opponent can be restricted to: 
  (   )  { ( )   [ | ]| (  ( )    ( ))    ( )    ( )} 
Then, the protocol  is a ITSP if it verifies the following property ( ): 
         |      (   )  ( | )   ( | )                                   ( ) 
It has been shown ([4], [5]) that when a protocol satisfies  ( | )   ( | )   , it can be 
complemented with Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification techniques to reach as close as desired 
from Perfect Secrecy. 
We also impose a second condition for the definition of an ITSP  . The second condition ensures that 
one can implement a DRG suitable for the protocol   thanks to a recursive and continuous generation 
  
algorithm that emulates locally the protocol. This approach is presented in section IV and introduced 
below. The second condition is the following: 
     such that for any strategy  ( )  { [ | ]|  ( )     }, there exists an actual distribution 
 ( )      of the variables   and   that verifies ( | )   ( | )    
(  ) 
The condition (  ) means that for any optimal strategy  ( ) for the distribution  , there exists a new 
distribution  ( )     , such that the condition  ( | )   ( | )    is satisfied (we take    
     to calculate  ( | ) because symmetry in the roles   and   can be assumed when their DRG 
have same design).   does not depend on    because the generation of a distribution by a DRG takes 
place before any instantiation of the protocol. The interest of that condition is that it enables to build a 
Deep Random Generator as follows: 
Deep Random Generation 
A DRG is designed in association with a given ITSP  . The DRG executes continuously the following 
recursive procedure: at each step   , the generator emulates the ITSP internally and picks (through 
classical randomness) a new couple of identical distributions     ( )          
 ( )      ( ) 
that defeats the optimal strategy (thus belonging to { [ | ]|  ( )     }) for the past distributions 
for    . This is always possible for an ITSP as given by condition (  ). The source of secret 
entropy is the current values of the inifinite counters (several can run in parallel) of the continuous 
recursive process, together with the classical random that is used at each step to pick a defeating 
distribution. 
In the present article, we will not focus on simulating a real DRG, but rather on simulating an example 
of ITSP, introduced in [9], working for the purpose of the simulation with a dummy emulated DRG. 
 
Back on the presentation of protocol  (introduced in [9]) 
The following ITSP has been presented in [9]. In order to shortly remind the notations, the sample 
space of the distribution of the private information (for   or  ) is  [   ] . Considering   (       ) 
and   (       ) some parameter vectors in [   ]
  and   (       ) and   (       ) some 
Bernoulli experiment vectors in {   } , we denote : 
    (resp.    ) the scalar product of   and   (resp.   and  ) 
| |  ∑   
 
    ; | |  ∑   
 
    
     ,  ( ) represents (  ( )     ( )) 
 
 
 represents (
  
 
   
  
 
) for     
  
In that protocol, besides being hidden to any third party (opponent or partner), the probability 
distribution used by each legitimate partner also needs to have specific properties in order to prevent 
the opponent to efficiently evaluate    by using internal symmetry of the distribution. 
Those specific properties are : 
  
(i) Each probability distribution   (for   or  ) must be « far » from its symmetric projection 
 ̅( )  
 
  
∑    ( )     
(ii) At least one of the distribution (of   or  ) must avoid to have brutal variations (Dirac) 
The technical details explaining those constraints are presented in [9]. The set of compliant 
distributions is denoted  ( ) where   is a parameter that measures the « remoteness » of a distribution 
from its symmetric projection. 
For such a distribution  , a tidying permutation, denoted   , is a specific permutation that enables to 
give a canonical form      of  , such form being useful to « synchronize » two distributions by 
transitivity. Again, technical details are given in [9]. One can just say here that it is linked to the 
quadratic matrix whose coefficient is  (   )  ∫      ( )  
 
[   ] 
, by minimizing 
∑      (   )
         ̅
    
    
( ∑     (   )
         ̅
) 
where    {    
 
 ⁄ }. 
 
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol: 
  and   are two AE, called the legitimate partners. The steps of the protocol  (       ) are the 
followings: 
Step 1 – Deep Random Generation:   and   pick independently the respective probability 
distributions  and    ( ), so that  (resp.  ) is secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any 
observer other than   (resp.  ) beholding all the published information.   draws the parameter vector 
  [   ]  from .   draws the parameter vector   [   ]  from  . 
Step 2 – Degradation:   generates a Bernoulli experiment vectors   {   }  from the parameter 
vector  
 
 
.   publishes  .   generates a Bernoulli experiment vectors   {   }  from the parameter 
vector  
 
 
.   publishes  . 
Step 3 – Dispersion:   and   also pick respectively a second probability distribution   and    ( ) 
such that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ).  
is selected also such that ∫  ( )  
 
| | [ | | √   | | √ ]
 
 
 √ 
 in order to ensure that | | is not an 
unlikely value for  |
 
 
| (same for   by replacing   by   and   by  ).    (resp.   ) is used to 
scramble the publication of the tidying permutation of   (resp.  ).   (resp.  ) calculates a 
permutation   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) representing the reverse of the most likely tidying permutation on   
(resp.  ) to produce   (resp.  ). In other words, with  ,   [ ] realizes : 
   
    
∫ ( | )      
  ( )  
 
 
 
  
Then   (resp.  ) draws a boolean   {   } (resp.   ) and publishes in a random order (     )  
  (  [ ]   ), (resp. (       )   
  (   [ ]    )) where   represents the transposition of elements in 
a couple. 
Step 4 – Synchronization:   (resp.  ) chooses randomly    (resp.   )  among (       ) (resp. 
(     )). 
Step 5 – Decorrelation:   computes    
  
  ( )  
  ( )
 
,   computes    
  
  ( ) 
  
  ( )
 
.    and    
are then transformed respectively by   and   in binary output thanks to a sampling method described 
hereafter. At this stage the protocol can then be seen as a broadcast model with 2 Binary Symmetric 
Channels (BSC), one between   and   and one between   and   who computes a certain   , called 
 ’s strategy, that is to be transformed in binary output by the same sampling method than for   and  . 
It is shown in Theorem 1 of [9] that those 2 BSC are partially independent, which enable to create 
Advantage Distillation as shown in [5]. 
Step 5’ – Advantage Distillation: by applying error correcting techniques with code words of length   
between   and  , as introduced in [5], we show in Theorem 1 of [9] that we can then create 
advantage for   compared to   in the error rates of the binary flows resulting from the error 
correcting code. 
Step 6: classical Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification (IRPA) techniques then lead to 
get accuracy as close as desired from perfection between estimations of legitimate partners, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimitedly powered opponent, as shown in [4]. 
 
The choices of the parameters (       ) are theoretically discussed in proof of main Theorem in [9]. 
They are discussed based on practicle simulations in the following section. They are set to make steps 
5, 5’ and 6 possible. 
The Degradation transformations   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 with     at step 2 are the ones that prevent the 
use of direct inference by the opponent, and of course, the Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents 
the use of Bayesian inference based on the knowledge of the probability distribution. The 
synchronization step 4 is designed to overcome the independence between the choices of the 
distributions of   and  , and needs that the distributions to have special properties (  ( )) in order to 
efficiently play their role. It is efficient in   ⁄  of cases (when   picks       and   picks       , 
which we will call favorable cases). And to prevent   from gaining knowledge of   , Dispersion step 
3 mixes    within (     ) with another permutation   [ ] (and     within (       ) with another 
permutation    [ ]) that (1) is undistinguishable from    knowing  , and (2) manages to make the 
estimation of   unefficient as shown in [9]. We denote the following set of strategies (invariant by 
transposition of (     ) or ( 
 
   
 
 )): 
  
  { (    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )) |    
  {   }  (      (     )  
  (     
 
 ))
  (    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 ))} 
Because of Deep Random assumption ( ) over the group {    } applied to the distribution of (     ) 
and (       ), the strategy of the opponent can thus be restricted to      
 . 
  
  is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the constraint and transformation 
applied on  in step 3 to make    and   [ ] indisguishable knowing   (same with    [ ],    , and  ). 
The synchronization step has a cost when considering the favorable cases:   knows that   and    are 
synchronized in favorable cases, which means in other words that   knows that an optimal (or quasi 
optimal) permutation is applied to   . This also means that in favorable cases, all happen like if when 
  picks     instead of  , the result of the synchronization is that   uses      instead of   . 
Starting from the most general strategy     
  for  , we also consider the following additional 
restrictions applicable to the favorable cases: 
 Restriction to the strategies of the form  (   ), because (  [ ]    [ ]) depends only on (   ) 
and not on  neither  , 
 And then restriction to the set of strategies such that        ( ) ( )      , in other 
words strategies invariant by common permutation on    . 
which leads to define the more restricted set of strategies: 
  (   )  {  [   ]
   | ( ( )  ( )              )   ( ( )  ( ))   (   )        } 
The step 5 is called Decorrelation because at this step, thanks to the Deep Random Assumption, we 
have managed to create a protocol that can be equivalently modelized by a broadcast communication 
over 2 partially independent (not fully correlated) BSC, as shown in the main Theorem in [9], and also 
that consequently, it is possible to apply error correcting techniques to create Advantage Distillation as 
established in [5]. 
We can use the following very basic technique to transform    and    in an intermediate binary flow 
as introduced in step 5: we can typically sample a value in [   ] like    or    with a gauge being a 
multiple of the variance  [(  |      
   |     )
 
]
 
 ⁄
  (
 
√  
). The multiplicative factor   is 
chosen such that : 
 
√  
 
 
√  
 
 
√ 
 
and therefore, each experiment of the protocol can lead respectively   and   to distill an intermediate 
digit defined by : 
  ̃  [
  √  
 
]      ,   ̃  [
  √  
 
]       
Regarding the legitimate partners, when   picks       and   picks       , the choice of    and 
   remain independent from    , so that   and   remain draws of independent Bernoulli random 
variables, then allowing to apply Chernoff-style bounds for the legitimate partners. When   picks 
     [ ] or   picks       [ ], this is no longer true and    or    become erratic, which will lead 
to error detection by error correcting code at step 5’. 
The heuristic table analysis of the protocol is then the following: 
   picks       among (     )   picks      [ ] among (     ) 
  picks        
among (       ) 
  and   respective estimations are 
close in ~100% of cases, and thus 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
  
both obtain accurate estimation of the 
combined shared secret in ~100% of 
cases. 
 
  cannot make accurate estimation of 
the combined shared secret in at least 
~25% of cases (if   tries to have a 
strategy depending on 
(             ), then (  [ ]    [ ]) 
is indistinguishable from (      ) 
and is thus picked by   in 25% of 
cases. 
detection and finally discarding. 
  picks       [ ] 
among (       ) 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
detection and finally discarding. 
  and   respective estimations are 
not close which leads to error 
detection and finally discarding. 
 
This is a heuristic reasoning, and we must rather consider most general strategies 
 (                 ) and write the probability equations with the appropriate group transform, under 
Deep Random assumption, which is done in [9]. But this little array explains why we create partial 
independence between the BSC and consequently then an advantage for the legitimate partners 
compared to the opponent, bearing in mind that (     ) (resp. (       )) are absolutely 
undistinguishable knowing   (resp.  ), due to the fact that the distributions   and   (resp.    and   ) 
are unknown and thus also absolutely undistinguishable by  . 
 
The sampling method presented above has the drawback of the border effect. If the reference value    
is too close from one of the sampling frontier {
  
√  
}
   
, then the sampling process becomes 
unefficient. In order to avoid the border effect, one can bring a little improvement to the protocol by 
allowing   to publish : 
      
 
√  
[  
√  
 
] 
and then to replace    by       
 
 √  
    in order to center    within the sampling comb. This 
of course results in applying the same transform on    and   : 
   
 
√  
[(   
 
 √  
   )
√  
 
]  
 
 √  
 
  
 
√  
[(  
 
 √  
   )
√  
 
]  
 
 √  
 
The publication of    does not bring any additional information to the opponent regarding the 
valuable secret information being the parity of [  
√  
 
]. 
 
  
The following section presents simulation and results confirming numerically that one can obtain 
strictly positive values of the Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9] with appropriate values of 
(       ). The induced lower bound of the Cryptologic Limit is also measured. 
  
II. Presentation of simulation and results 
Handling dummy DRGs 
In our simulation, we don’t focus on DRG but specifically on the ITSP presented in the previous 
section. The DRG of each partner is emulated from a fixed distribution   in  ( ) with         . 
   is defined by : 
 (∑  
 
 ⁄
   
  )   ( ∑   
 
    ⁄   
   )  
 
 
       {      ⁄ } 
Its quadratic matrix is: 
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
   
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
|
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
   
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
   
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
|
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
   
 
 ⁄  
 
 ⁄
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
And it verifies, still with notations of [9] : 
‖       
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ‖
 
 √  
 
  
  (
 
 
) 
Input parameters, dispersion and error correcting 
The simulation is executed for a given set of parameters (       ) and, at each execution, it repeats 
  times the protocol. The dispersion is simulated by the generation of   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) in such a 
way that     [ ](  ) (resp.      [ ](  )) and randomly, one time over two in average,   (resp. 
also and independently for  ) chooses       [ ] rather than       (resp.      [ ] rather than 
     ), which simulates the random choice of   (resp. also and independently for  ) among 
(       ) (resp. (     )). One can notice that it is useless to introduce random permutation in the 
draw of   because it is easy to verify that   [ ][    ]   
     [ ][  ] and thus 
       [ ][    ]       [ ][  ] 
In those simulations, we mainly focus on Advantage Distillation. The effect of Privacy Amplification 
will be discussed for one of the simulations. Information Reconciliation is not fully considered, but 
error correcting methods need to be handled at step 5’ in order to achieve Advantage Distillation. We 
will use the (non-optimal) method proposed by Maurer in [5]; the codewords     chosen by   can only 
be (       )  or (       )  depending on      or     .   publicly discards all decoded 
sequence    that is not (       )  or (       )  and obviously decodes accordingly      if 
|  |   , and      if |  |   . 
The discarding rate is denoted  , corresponding to the average ratio of discarded sequences. 
  
Behavior of the opponent 
The behavior of the opponent is tested with 3 canonical strategies among    (   ) :  
  (   )  
    
 
 
  (   )  
 | || |
  
 
  (    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 ))  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
where     is a permutation randomly chosen by   among (     ) and     is a permutation randomly 
chosen by   among (     
 
 ). 
A pessimistic approach is adopted in which, the best of the three is selected for the opponent at the end 
of the execution of a simulation, separately for each measured criteria, when delivering the result 
(« best » meaning the one that gives the most favorable criteria for the opponent, typically the higher 
opponent’s knowledge rate over the private information, or the lesser Cryptologic Limit).  
Those three strategies are chosen on purpose: 
    represents the only strategy that equalizes 
 [  |(   ) (       )]   [  |(   ) (       )] (See [9] section II for the details) ; 
    represents the canonical strategy beating the partners in case their distributions are not 
synchronized (e.g. which needs to avoid       and       ). 
    represents the canonical strategy when   tries to « guess » and use the permutations    
and     ;    is efficient when   guess correctly. 
Output of simulation 
Each execution of the simulation outputs 3 information: 
(i) the error rate for the legitimate partners – denoted  , 
(ii) the knowledge rate for the opponent – denoted   , and 
(iii) a lower bound of Cryptologic Limit – denoted   . 
 (     ) and | (     )  
 
 
| can be seen respectively as the error rate and ‘eavesdropping’ rate, 
so both with values in [   ]. We decided in [9], by convention that fits the common sense, that 
 (     ) cannot be greater than   ⁄ , and  (     ) cannot be lower than   ⁄  ; indeed, if 
 (     )    ⁄  one can replace    by   ̅̅ ̅ (we then denote   
  the final choice for   ), and if 
 (     )    ⁄  one can replace    by   ̅̅ ̅ (we then denote   
  the final choice for   ). And 
therefore, we can define   as the net error rate, and    as the net knowledge rate (by the opponent), 
with the following formulas: 
(i)    (    ( (     )    (     )))    (     
 ) 
(ii)     (   ( (     )    (     ))  
 
 
)   ( (     
 )  
 
 
)     
  
   as introduced in [9], represents the rate of perfectly reliable bit transmitted over the total amount of 
bit transmitted, which in the case of the protocol is : 
(iii)    (   )
      
   
 (one can remark that it is possible to only transmit   (  ) instead of 
  , which can be coded with   bits instead of       ). 
The simulation also uses the border effect improvement presented in section I, unless the opposite 
choice is explicitly mentioned in the condition of the simulation. 
The 3 output information are measured as averaged over all the   repetitions of the protocol within an 
execution of the simulation. 
Presentation of the results 
We have executed series of simulations with 3 dimensional coursing of parameters (     ), and with 
  being equal to at least 5,000. 
The simulation program is written in C language, generated with Visual Studio 2015 on Windows 7 - 
64 bits. It uses the random generator RAND( ) of the stdlib.h standard library. 
In the following results, the sampling parameter   is expressed as a multiple of  
 
 √  
. 
In all the graphics below, the abscissa represents the coursing parameter values, the left ordinate 
represents the values of error rate   and knowledge rate   , the right ordinate represents the values of 
the Cryptologic Limit’s lower bound    with value being multiple of     , and the title of the graphic 
gives the values of the fixed parameters, and the range of the coursing parameter. 
 
  
  
In the first graphic presented below, the values of the fixed parameters are (               
 ),   is coursing from   to   . 
 
The maximum of    is obtained for    . As   is increasing, the error rate is decreasing, and the 
knowledge rate is increasing, as expected. 
The graphic below performs on the same parameters’ values but without the border effect avoidance 
improvement. One can see that    reaches a lesser maximum. 
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The second graphic below illustrates the use of a larger value for     . One can see that it enables 
to reach a lower value of the error rate but the price to pay is a quicker increase of the knowledge rate, 
eventually resulting in a lower maximum of   . Indeed, increasing   too much results in lowering the 
sharpness of the synchronization process, and then favoring the efficiency of opponent’s strategy   .  
 
 
The third graphic below represents the coursing of parameter   when (               ) 
are fixed. It illustrates that, from a certain point, increasing   has no positive effect on the outputs. The 
maximum of    coincides with the optimal lowest value of the knowledge rate. The increase of   has 
a strong effect on lowering the knowledge rate at the begining, but then, as already discussed, creates a 
back effect that lowers the efficiency of synchronization. 
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The forth graphic below presents the effect of increasing the codelength  . The fixed parameters are 
(                ) ; the codelength is coursing from   to   . 
 
The maximum value for    is rapidly obtained for    . As expected when   increases, the error rate 
decreases and knowledge increases.  
The fifth graphic below presents a larger value of parameter        . The other fixed parameters 
are (       ). The learning from this graphic is that increasing the value of   does not really 
help, even for the values of the error and knowledge rates, compared to the best results obtained with 
typically        . It means that the internal parameters of the protocol are sufficient to create 
Advantage Distillation, but are not efficient enough to create strong Information Reconciliation and 
Privacy Amplification (IRPA). This suggests to add external sophisticated method for IRPA, as 
proposed in [4] and [13] to reach very low values of   and    acceptable for real implementation. We 
will discuss this in further work. 
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Finally, in the sixth graphic, we present the effect of Privacy Amplification. We start from the result 
obtained in the fourth graphic for the highest value of  , which gives the fixed parameters (  
                   ). We apply a simple Privacy Amplification method corresponding to 
the universal hashing function « multiply-add-shift »     ( )  ((    )     
  )          , for 
which parameters     are picked for each new output digit (distilled from sequences of    input 
digits). The codewords size    varies from   to    : 
 
The reduction of the knowledge rate is of course at cost of the increase of the error rate, and at the 
overall decrease of   . It is stated however without proof that IRPA techniques are more efficient than 
increasing the value of  . 
 
As a main conclusion of this work, it is obtained that the Cryptologic Limit   introduced in [9] can be 
approximately lower bounded by: 
            
as per result of the fourth simulation (fourth graphic) presented above. That lower bound is absolutely 
not considered as optimal, and should be considered with the remarks that (i) we did not use real DRG 
but just emulations, (ii) we only considered the 3 strategies (        ) for the opponent. However, (i) 
the choice of (        ) appear as the most natural, and (ii) we gave an additional artificial 
advantage for the opponent by systematically choosing the best strategy among (        ) from the 
measures, which an actual opponent would not be able to do. 
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